Monday 14 September 2020 by Laposa UK
$ git clone email@example.com:sdushantha/tmpmail.git
$ brew install w3m jq
[ Inbox for firstname.lastname@example.org ]
No new mail
Tuesday 1 October 2019 by Laposa UK
alias prettyjson='python -m json.tool'
alias pwgen='openssl rand 8 -base64'
Tuesday 9 January 2018 by Norbert Laposa
We are receiving questions from our clients about the latest security issues found in CPUs.
Please be asured we are constantly monitoring all security announcements issued by our OS vendor (i.e. https://www.debian.org/security/) and we receive all updates to our email and we apply the changes within 24 hours as part our service.
We can confirm that all our servers are now safe from both the bugs.
Our PCI compliant server customers can are also protected by extra security measures which includes:
All other customers are running in a Cloud environment and the OS was fixed by our supplier, see https://forum.bytemark.co.uk/t/meltdown-specture-vulnerabilities-what-were-doing-about-them/2784
Tuesday 25 July 2017 by Laposa UK
$ apt install motion
$ vi /etc/motion/motion.conf
Find the following lines and make the following changes.
$ vi /etc/default/motion
Make the following change:
Next we need to make sure the motion capture directory is writable
$ chmod 777 /var/lib/motion
Now make sure the camera is connected and start the service with the command:
$ service motion start
To stop the service, the command is:
$ service motion stop
Now you can view the camera from a browser on the Pi (or other computer if stream_localhost was set to off) by connecting to your Pi’s IP address and Motion’s default port 8081
$ crontab -e
@reboot /usr/local/bin/open_tunel &
$ vi /usr/local/bin/open_tunel
autossh -M 0 -f -T -N mywebserver.example.org -g -R 0.0.0.0:8081:localhost:8081
ProxyPass /motion http://localhost:8081
ProxyPassReverse /motion http://localhost:8081
ProxyPass /motion.jpeg http://localhost:8081
ProxyPassReverse /motion.jpeg http://localhost:8081
Monday 3 July 2017 by Laposa UK
One great security feature Onxshop has is the way how user uploaded files are saved. Onxshop is saving all files outside of web folder, which means that it is not possible to execute any files uploaded by users.
Here is an example how effective the Onxshop way is agains this type of security hole.
On our demo site, which is open to public CMS users, somebody tried to upload this .htaccess file, which allows to interpret PNGs as PHP script files.
AddType application/x-httpd-php .png
The attacker then uploaded a script similar to this:
<?php # Web Shell by oRb
$auth_pass = "63a9f0ea7bb98050796b649e85481845";
$color = "#df5";
$default_action = 'FilesMan';
$default_use_ajax = true;
$default_charset = 'Windows-1251';
Of course, it was rendered as completely useless and the attacker didn't gain any access to the website.
For example in Wordpress, backdoors can be hidden in scripts similar to this: /wp-content/upgrade/wp-mails.php
It looks like a genuine Wordpress script, but it's actually a file uploaded under a CMS user. This type of files are then used for sending spams, or executing DDoS attack.